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ABSTRACT 
 
In the nineteenth century, justice in the Ottoman Empire 
appeared to international jurists deeply corrupted and far from the 
Western model. European consular jurisdictions, as in the past, 
solved this embarrassment in the prevalent and private interest of 
Western States in order to control the Mediterranean area. This 
perpetrated abjuration to recognize an autonomous and sovereign 
Ottoman administration of justice in civil or criminal cases in 
which foreigners were involved continued, in spite of the fact that 
the Porte provided excellent examples of intersection, reception 
and appropriation of foreign models to construct a new legal 
system, and to transform society. This process of “westernization” 
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or “modernization” formally started in 1839, by the Hatt Hümayün 
of Gülkhâne. In order to halt the contradictions derived from the 
coexistence of the last (French and English) treaties of commerce 
of 1838 and their confirmation of privileges and consular 
jurisdiction with the driven effort of Ottoman juridical reforms of 
Tanzîmât period, in 1840 in both Turkey and Egypt, mixed traders 
councils composed of local and foreign traders were established. In 
1840 the “commercial board” was born in Turkey and, in 1848, 
European Powers holding capitulary privileges negotiated the 
formal recognition of mixed tribunals (which were regulated in 
1873 and formally inaugurated in 1875). This embarrassing 
situation was getting worse and accumulating contradictions when 
in 1856, at the Congress of Paris, the Ottoman Empire was 
“admitted to participate in the advantages of European Public Law 
and system” (art. 7 of the Treaty). Thanks to those words, the 
logical preamble of consular jurisdictions and their 
extraterritoriality (mitigated by the “monstrous” compromise of 
mixed tribunals), formally failed. There was a need to investigate 
and redefine the paradigmatic declensions of sovereignty in the 
relations between European Powers and the Ottoman Empire 
during the nineteenth century.   
 
I. A SOVEREIGNTY IN ABEYANCE: PREMISE 
 
Between the seventeenth and eighteenth century, 
sovereignty was perceived as a mutually recognized right of the 
states to exercise exclusive authority over particular territories. 
This was the Westphalian model, successively qualified by the 
jurists as the “ideal type” of sovereignty. It suggested the respect of 
the other state’s sole authority in domestic affairs, the control over 
the flow of goods and bodies within each state’s borders, and the 
establishment of relations as among equal states in the 
international system. It would be the reference paradigm for the 
later principle of non-intervention.  
However, as Stephen Krasner underlined in 1999, this 
model often worked as an “organized hypocrisy,” when there was 
no accurate correspondence to many of the entities that have been 
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regarded as states.1 In several cases, states’ sovereignty had been 
compromised by contracts and conventions, impositions and 
interventions. This was particularly clear, and paradoxically 
palpable, for the Sublime Porte: in the nineteenth century there was 
something invalidating and compromising the declension of the 
“ideal type” of the Ottoman sovereignty.2  
Antoine Pillet, in 1899, summarized his general perceptions 
on this topic in an interesting, and as yet not very well-known, 
essay on Les Droits Fondamentaux des États dans l’ordre des 
rapports internationaux. The work opened with a precise statement 
which showed traces of James Lorimer’s attitude:3  
Il semble que . . . une question préalable s’impose 
d’abord à l’examen: les États ont-ils, dans leur 
rapports fondamentaux, des droits qui existent par 
eux-mêmes, . . . des droits qui résultent . . . de la 
seule coexistence d’États civilisés (car nous ne nous 
occuperons que de ceux-là) . . . ? 
Only civilized states were owners of fundamental rights, and 
parts of the family of nations. In particular, about the “droit 
d’égalité,” Pillet added:  
Les États ne sont pas égaux entre eux . . . D’abord, 
il n’existe aucune égalité de droits entre les États 
civilisés et les États non civilisés ou moins civilisés. 
Les premiers se gèrent constamment dans leurs 
rapports avec les seconds comme des supérieurs 
chargés de la mission de les faire entrer de gré ou de 
                                                                                                             
 1.  STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 69 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999). 
 2.  See id. at 20; Aida A. Hozic, The Paradox of Sovereignty in the 
Balkans, in THE STATE OF SOVEREIGNTY: TERRITORIES, LAWS, POPULATIONS 
245 (Douglas Howland & Luise S. White eds., Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 2009) (on the Westphalian sovereignty); Amin Saikal, 
Westphalian and Islamic Concepts of Sovereignty in the Middle East, in RE-
ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA 75 et seq. (Trudy 
Jacobsen et al. eds., Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot 2008) (about the 
difference between the Westphalian meaning of the concept and the complex 
Islamic understanding of the phenomenon of “sovereignty”). 
 3.  JAMES LORIMER, 1 THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: A 
TREATISE OF THE JURAL RELATIONS OF SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 101 
(W. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London 1883). 
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force dans les voies de la civilisation : à ce titre ils 
s’arrogent envers eux certains droits de direction, de 
contrôle et parfois d’administration que ceux-ci ne 
possèdent en aucune façon à leur égard. Entre la 
condition des uns et la condition des autres, il y a 
inégalité fragrante et cette inégalité est en la matière 
la véritable base de leurs relations.4  
States are not equal. Civilization is the measure of this non-
equality. There are civilized and uncivilized states: the gap of 
civilization conditions the real nature of their relations based on a 
true dimension of non-equality. Civilized states have rights of 
direction, control and administration over uncivilized states: this is 
their mission in order to lead the latter to civilization. 
This idea, shared also by John Westlake and Thomas 
Joseph Lawrence,5 clashed with the regulative ideal of an inclusive 
political pluralism of the international society and built, instead, its 
assumptions on a hierarchical ordering of it.6 The constitution of 
the different legal status of an “uncivilized state,” in fact, definitely 
solved the conflict between formal juridical equality of sovereign 
states and persistent power inequalities, also legitimating the 
unequal juridical language of the relations among them.7 The 
“uncivilization” caused a deminutio of sovereignty for the 
uncivilized states and, consequently, permitted (in front of a silent 
international law) the interference of civilized states in their 
domestic and foreign affairs. Evidently, this was not a reciprocal 
and consensual process. The so-called “development” of the 
international law of the twentieth century removed the 
                                                                                                             
 4.  ANTOINE PILLET, RECHERCHES SUR LES DROITS FONDAMENTAUX DES 
ÉTATS DANS L’ORDRE DES RAPPORTS INTERNATIONAUX ET SUR LA SOLUTION DES 
CONFLITS QU’ILS FONT NAITRE 6 (Paris, 1899). 
 5.  JOHN WESTLAKE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 321-322, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1910); THOMAS JOSEPH LAWRENCE, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (Macmillan, London, 1905).  
 6.  GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL 
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 25 (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2004).  
 7.  See Hozic, supra note 2, at 255; SIMPSON, supra note 6, at 336 et seq.; 
Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century 
Histories of Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 476, 518 
(2010); Gustavo Gozzi, The Particularistic Universalism of International Law in 
the Nineteenth Century, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 73, 76-77 (2010). 
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subordination of sovereignty and the absence of reciprocity as 
marking dimensions of that non-equality, and only underlined this 
aspect of the duress of the relations.8 Consequently, in line with 
nineteenth century European colonial politics, an automatic 
equation of colonial projects with the formal assumption of 
sovereignty by European Powers over non-European territories and 
peoples began to work.9  
Next to the deficit of civilization, as Aida Hozic has 
recently noticed, one of the reasons for the paradox of a “non-
sovereign sovereignty” of the Ottoman Empire in its unequal 
relations with European Powers in the nineteenth century was that 
it had been frequently violated in the name of the sovereignty 
itself.10 Carl Schmitt said that the sovereign was the one who 
decided on the exception.11 According to Giorgio Agamben and 
his suggestions on the logical antinomies of sovereignty, the 
sovereign’s ability to suspend laws created those “juridically 
empty” states of exception. The states of exception had two 
essential criteria of individualization: the absolute necessity and 
the temporary state.12 Since there were two levels of sovereignty—
one, artificial and anomalous, of the civilized states over the 
“uncivilized” Ottoman Empire, and the other, original and 
inadequate, of the Ottoman Empire itself over its own territory—
two suspensions of the Ottoman order were possible. 
First, the Ottoman Empire, as a “geographical exception” of 
a Christian and civilized Europe, underwent a deminutio majestatis 
which determined a corresponding sovereign extension (garentia) 
of European Powers’ sovereignty on it. The absolute necessity was 
to grant peaceful trade and judicial protection for the Western 
                                                                                                             
 8.  Matthew Craven, What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The 
Continuities of Informal Empire, 74 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
335, 380 (2005).  
 9.  The modern idea of unequal treaties was an “integral part of 
‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism.’” GERRIT GONG, THE STANDARD OF 
CIVILIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 66-67 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1984).  
 10.  Hozic, supra note 2, at 247. 
 11.  See Carl Schmitt, LE CATEGORIE DEL “POLITICO.” SAGGI DI TEORIA 
POLITICA (Gianfranco Miglio & Pierangelo Schiera eds., Il Mulino, Bologna, 
1972).  
 12.  GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATO DI ECCEZIONE 19 (Bollati Boringhieri, 
Torino, 2003).  
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peoples in transit or resident in the Ottoman territories; the 
temporary state of this necessity was determined by the Porte’s 
process of gradual appropriation of international rules and its 
adequacy to the Western standard of civilization. The presence of 
both criteria provoked a suspension of the Ottoman juridical 
order:13 those “juridically empty” states of exception were resolved 
by European intervention and consular jurisdiction.  
In the second place, the absolute necessity to manage the 
matter of Christian subjects and foreigners, resident or in transit on 
its territories, and the temporariness of the gradual process of their 
assimilation, led the Ottoman Empire itself to act on its residual 
sovereignty and to operate a suspension of its juridical order. By a 
“truce,” such as a temporary suspension of the political system 
towards the idolaters, the Ottoman sultans could grant Christians 
all the benefits of dialogue. This was the meaning of the old 
system of capitulations, of which the unequal treaties of the 
nineteenth century were the direct legacy.14  
In my opinion, this dualistic representation is the final 
aspect of an Ottoman “fantastic” sovereignty that needs to be 
investigated in relation with the jurisdiction problem:15 how was 
Ottoman sovereignty still held believable in face of the flagrant 
violations of its norms and in face of the logical antinomies of its 
constitutive principles operated by capitulations and unequal 
treaties? How was it possible to reconcile this state of 
subordination with the activation of the formal procedures for 
admission and participation of the Ottoman Empire to the 
European Concert of the nineteenth century? And what was the 
role of international law? 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 13.  This was a temporariness induced by the encouraged notion that only 
by emulating Western modes of governance polities on the periphery might be 
admitted into the family of nations. Cf. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISMO. 
L’IMMAGINE EUROPEA DELL’ORIENTE 78 et seq. (Stefano Galli ed., Feltrinelli, 
Milano, 2006). 
 14.  See Craven, supra note 8, at 344; Eliana Augusti, The Christian Matter 
and the Ottoman Empire: the Language of Compromise in the 19th Century, in  
TURNING POINTS AND BREAKLINES 64 (Szabolcs Hornyák et al. eds., 4 Jahrbuch 
Junge Rechtsgeschichte, M. Meidenbauer, München, 2009). 
 15.  Hozic, supra note 2, at 248.  
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II. DIALOGUE BY CAPITULATIONS 
 
“As a corollary of the principle of sovereignty, states are 
deemed to have jurisdiction over their own territory.”16 
“Extraterritorial jurisdiction is a provisional system which should 
be abandoned as and when the conditions justifying its adoption 
and application have ceased to exist.”17 In these two passages, 
Aida Hozic and Alexander Wood Renton, in different times and 
places, locate all the elements of the matter of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century 
(sovereignty, jurisdiction, territory). The two criteria of 
extraterritoriality (temporariness and necessity) implicitly appear 
as states of exception.  
In the nineteenth century international trade was the 
ancillary route towards the consolidation of old, and the 
construction of new, international relationships among states in the 
Mediterranean area. On the one side European, and Christian, 
Powers; on the other side the inevitable Muslim interlocutor, the 
Ottoman Empire and its differences. The foreign merchants had 
uncertain status within the Ottoman dominions where strategic 
Mediterranean places were. To move in this area under suitable 
conditions and security guarantees, European Powers needed 
common useful provisions. This jus commune of the 
Mediterranean-trade-foreigner was first based on the old regime of 
capitulations. Since the sixteenth century, Western states obtained 
these unilateral concession acts, by which privileges were 
recognized, from sultans.18 Normally, capitulations included a 
grant of immunity from the local jurisdiction and subjection to 
one’s consular jurisdiction as long as the foreign–and above all 
Christian–merchants lived in small communities in the ports (the 
so-called “farms”)19 and made proper provisions for the regulation 
                                                                                                             
 16.  Hozic, supra note 2, at 255. 
 17.  Alexander Wood Renton, The Revolt against the Capitulary System, 15 
J. OF COMP. LEG. & INT’L L. 222 (1933). 
 18.  See GABRIEL BIE RAVNDAL, THE ORIGIN OF THE CAPITULATIONS AND 
OF THE CONSULAR INSTITUTION (Books LLC, New York, 2009).  
     19.     Normalmente  erano designate le città e i porti, dove i cristiani 
potevano impiantare le loro fattorie e risiedere per ragioni di 
commercio. Queste fattorie erano zone o quartieri distinti dalla 
città, talora chiusi, dove si trovavano le abitazioni degli 
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of their affairs.20 As George Williams Keeton noticed in 1948, the 
feature of “unilateralism” of conceded privileges was not 
surprising: when, in fact, the first capitulations were granted by the 
Porte, the possibility of Turkish Muslim traders visiting or residing 
in European countries did not seem to have been considered.  
There was thus no real need of reciprocal recognitions. The state of 
things seemed to change in 1740, when France attained the 
attachment of capitulary privileges in an international treaty, also 
signed by the sultan. In this way, and for the first time, France 
turned the concessions into a contract binding in a synallagmatic 
way the Porte to it.21 Then, thanks to an extensive clause, the so 
called most-favourite-nation clause, not only France, but all 
European nations could enjoy contractual (and sanctioned) benefits 
of the imported capitulary text.  
Far from being contrary to other bilateral treaties or grants 
of European international law, capitulations hence became and 
remained until the twentieth century a common and normal 
incident of commerce with countries of non-Christian and non-
European civilization.22 European Powers accepted and 
consolidated capitulary exceptional regimes as functional to their 
aims, because they obtained the juridical guarantees for their 
citizens; capitulations protected their merchants, trade, contracts 
and cases; they established in the strategic specific places of 
Mediterranean Western presence and controlled, from a privileged 
inner position, their Muslim interlocutor. But even if capitulations 
                                                                                                             
 
stranieri ed erano costruiti i loro stabilimenti commerciali, 
magazzini, con chiesa, cimitero e il consolato. Ogni Nazione 
aveva la sua fattoria, e questa era una specie di Stato nello 
Stato, quindi ognuno nel proprio recinto godeva la più ampia 
libertà di culto, di commercio, di giurisdizione.  
FRANCESCO FERRARA, MANUALE DI DIRITTO CONSOLARE 17-18 (Cedam, 
Padova, 1936). 
 20.  “Capitulations désignant les conventions consulaires avec l’empire 
ottoman et, par extension, avec les autres états de l’Orient.” ALPHONSE RIVIER, 2 
PRINCIPES DU DROIT DES GENS 37 (A. Rousseau, Paris, (1896). 
 21.  PAUL PRADIER-FODÉRÉ, 2 TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
EUROPÉEN & AMÉRICAIN SUIVANT LES PROGRÈS DE LA SCIENCE ET DE LA 
PRATIQUE CONTEMPORAINES 689-691 (A. Durand & Pedone-Lauriel eds., Paris, 
1885). 
 22.  George Williams Keeton, Extraterritoriality in International and 
Comparative Law, 72 RECUEIL DES COURS 283, 351-352 (1948). 
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were an irremissible instrument for praxis and commercial intents, 
they were a taboo for European scholarship, which remained silent 
and did not give space to an in-depth study on them, their regime, 
and on the connected subject of consular jurisdiction, where the 
cases regulated by capitulations also fell.  
The complex task to reconstruct and understand was left to 
nineteenth and twentieth century scholarship, which inserted these 
evaluations into the more complex phase of the building of 
International Law as a discipline. It had to find an answer to the 
origin, the need to maintain and the impossibility to abolish this 
privileged system of provisions for foreigners (merchants or not), 
called capitulations, still in force in the Muslim lands. I want to 
propose and briefly analyze three argumentative criteria used by 
scholars, and their correlative contradictions: a) 
immiscibility/personality; b) extraterritoriality; c) nationality. 
 
III. UNDERSTAND AND LEGITIMIZE: THE IMMISCIBILITY, 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND NATIONALITY CRITERIA 
 
As natural consequence of the so-called principle of 
immiscibility or of the personality of law,23 Western and non-
Muslims foreigners were considered “outsiders” of Shar’ia, in 
which only the believers could participate.24 In a Christian state, 
i.e., in a state belonging to the European civilization, a foreign 
resident, merchant or not, was subject to local courts like the 
indigenous peoples (with only the exception of diplomats): there 
was a kind of jus commune on the ground of which the foreigner 
was like a subditus temporarius and, for this reason, he was put on 
the same level as a state citizen to exercise his civil rights and 
enjoy his administrative protection. He was excluded only from the 
enjoyment of political rights and duties. Instead, in the Ottoman 
dominions, by capitulations, he possessed a privileged status. He 
                                                                                                             
 23.  Edgar Turlington, Treaty Relations with Turkey, 35 YALE L.J. 326, 330 
(1926). The main feature of the siyar, i.e., the rules for the Muslims/non-
Muslims foreigner relations, was its nature of personal and non-territorial law. 
MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS. SHAYBANI’S SIYAR 62, (The 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1996).  
 24.  Enid Hill, Comparative and Historical Study of Modern Middle Eastern 
Law, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 279, 290 (1978). 
294 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 4 
 
 
 
had to comply with his own national laws, he was exempt from the 
jurisdiction of the Ottoman courts and he referred to his own 
consular one; he was, in other words, treated differently from 
Ottoman subjects.25 This fact was not, at the time these 
“agreements” were made, deemed to be in any way derogatory to 
the sovereignty and dignity of the sultans. Sovereignty and 
jurisdiction were at that time generally regarded–in Europe 
scarcely less than in the Levant–as personal rather than territorial; 
and, particularly in view of the Islamic doctrine of the 
immiscibility of Moslem and Christian communities and the 
radical divergence between the legal system of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Western Powers, it was considered to be the most 
natural and proper arrangement for foreigners in the Ottoman 
territories to be subject exclusively to the laws and jurisdiction of 
their own sovereigns, acting through their ministers and consuls.  
The capitulary “gracious” system was thus definitely a 
substantial part of the public law of the Ottoman Empire, because 
it was applied to all foreigners in the country and also regulated 
Ottomans’ contacts with foreigners within the Empire. It was also 
confirmed as an atypical part of the positive law of Western 
states:26 the sultans awarded capitulations only on the applicants’ 
explicit promise to keep peaceful relations with them, and on the 
understanding that any violation of the promise might lead to a 
unilateral revocation of the privileges.27 
When from this original position Western juridical tradition 
started moving towards a state dimension of law and a territorial 
dimension of sovereignty, however, it became more complex to 
justify and legalize the need to maintain these personal privileged 
agreements, resorting to confessional (and in this sense, personal) 
argumentations. From the fracture produced by the Protestant 
Reform and the Westphalia Acts, confessional aspects had been 
                                                                                                             
 25. ÉDOUARD PHILIPPE ENGELHARDT, LE DROIT D’INTERVENTION ET LA 
TURQUIE 13, (A. Cotillon & Co. ed., Paris, 1880). 
 26.  Maurits H. Van den Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal 
System. Qādis, Consuls and Beratlıs in the 18th Century, in 21 STUDIES IN 
ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 6, (Rudd Peters & Bernard Weiss eds., Brill, 
Leiden-Boston, 2005). 
 27.  Id. at 7. 
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put out of the international discourse:28 international law was 
among sovereign states; each state was sovereign on its own 
territory; states recognized themselves and each other as sovereign 
states on their territories.29 Common religion was not anymore a 
remarkable and conditioning connotation of international relations 
among states and, for this reason, it was replaced by a more 
convincing paradigm of a shared civilization. The Muslim 
principle of immiscibility and of the personality of law did not 
work well anymore, but contradictions remained.30  
Even if the open transition in seventeenth-nineteenth 
centuries from the Jus Publicum Europaeum to international law 
had started changing the way in which the international relations 
among proclaimed non-confessional states had to be defined, and 
even if the growth of commercial demand looked for new criteria 
to be regulated, in the nineteenth century religion still influenced 
the European approach to Muslim states, and all the doubts about 
their “un-civilized” systems of justice remained.31  The Ottoman 
system, in particular, appeared deeply corrupted and far from the 
Western model. Its theocratic system negatively conditioned 
European perception of the Porte, and let one conclude for an auto-
exclusion, an auto “mise au ban de la civilisation” of the Empire.32 
The rights of presence, control, police, inspection and 
                                                                                                             
 28.  Luigi Nuzzo, Un mondo senza nemici. La costruzione del diritto 
internazionale e il controllo delle differenze, 38 QUADERNI FIORENTINI PER LA 
STORIA DEL PENSIERO GIURIDICO MODERNO 1311-1335 (2009). 
 29.  Parlare di rapporti internazionali fra subbietti  senza  sovranità 
territoriale, è accozzare parole senza significato. Non sarebbe 
esatto dire: lo Stato ha la sovranità territoriale; è sufficiente 
dire: lo Stato è persona del diritto internazionale; l’analisi di 
questa persona poi ci dimostra la esistenza di una sovranità 
territoriale.  
CARLO GHIRARDINI, LA SOVRANITÀ TERRITORIALE NEL DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE 53 (,P. Fezzi & C. Cremona,   1913). 
 30.  But see NASIM SOÜSA, THE HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
ORIGIN OF THE CAPITULATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (J. Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, 1930). 
 31.  Le  bon  sens  suggère  tout  d’abord   la  supposition  que  sans 
doute en Turquie la magistrature n’offre point les garanties 
d’intégrité, d’impartialité et de lumière qui pour tout individu 
éloigné de son pays sont la première sauvegarde de sa liberté, 
de sa fortune, de son honneur et de sa vie. 
Édouard Engelhardt, La Turquie et les Principautés Danubiennes, 13 REVUE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE 535 (1881). 
 32.  Id. at 537. 
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administrative intervention of the consuls’ jurisdictional power as 
provided by conventions and used in the Christian countries, could 
not assure a “distribution tolérable de la justice.”33 For this reason, 
despite the general rule of a “pouvoir judiciaire des consuls 
nécessairement restreint, par le principe de la souveraineté 
territoriale, aux droits résultant des stipulations conventionnelles 
ou de l’usage consacré,” in the Ottoman territories the consulars’ 
power became something more: they could solve the 
embarrassment of the inadequate justice system in the prevalent 
and private interest of Western states.34 The foreign consuls had 
jurisdiction over cases between their nationals as capitulations 
consecrated in the past “dans des termes si catégoriques que le 
gouvernement ottoman n’a jamais essayé de la contester.” It was a 
datum de facto and de jure.  Article 26 of the French Capitulation 
of 1740 said: “S’il arrive quelque contestation entre les Français, 
leurs ambassadeurs et leurs consuls en prendront connaissance et 
en décideront, selon leurs us et coutumes, sans que personne puisse 
s’y opposer.”35 The incompetence of the Ottoman tribunals for 
civil or criminal disputes between foreigners of the same 
nationality was absolute, i.e., independent from the will of the 
parties; it was, André Mandelstam underlined, “d’ordre public.”36 
The common and shared Western policy was confirmed: no 
renunciation of the old privileges was planned; consular 
jurisdiction had to keep working. 
Facing the raising of territorial sovereignty, the old 
principle of personality seemed to transmit in a principle of 
extraterritoriality. In the rhetorical construction of international 
law, the consulates became “closed political centers” on foreign 
territory, just like states within the state. This exceptional regime 
was supported by the old ratio to find guarantees for foreigners 
where they were lacking. According to the principle of 
                                                                                                             
 33.  Id. at 535. 
 34.  William Beach Lawrence, Étude sur la juridiction consulaire, 13 
REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE 45 (1881). 
 35.  Translated from the Turkish text by ANDRÉ MANDELSTAM, LA JUSTICE 
OTTOMANE DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LES PUISSANCES ETRANGÈRES 217 (A. 
Pedone, Paris, 1908). WILHELM G. GREWE, 2 FONTES HISTORIAE IURIS GENTIUM 
72-73 (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York, 1988) (In the same way the text of 
the first Franco-Turkish Capitulation of 1535, art. III). 
 36. MANDELSTAM, supra note 35, at 218. 
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extraterritoriality: first, foreigners enjoyed extraterritoriality in the 
sense that even if they were on the Ottoman territory, they were by 
fictio out of it, i.e., extra territorium; second, they were considered 
as in their country, even if in fact they were not. In the twentieth 
century, this conception was deeply criticized when, among many 
exceptions, scholars noticed that the foreigner remained subject to 
the local laws anyway.37 In despite of extraterritoriality, the 
privileged condition of a foreigner (and consular jurisdiction) was 
qualified as an exceptional status by which he remained under the 
territorial power of the residency state, but free from its coercive 
power. This was possible thanks to an express waiver of the state 
territorial sovereignty on him, and the consequent concession to 
the foreign national state to continue personal sovereignty over 
him.38 In this sense, as someone said, already at the end of the 
nineteenth century, capitulations appeared as “negative servitudes” 
which connected the exceptional condition of foreigner from the 
old system of the personality of law, to the new one of nationality. 
“Les Capitulations et traités conclus avec la Turquie, le Japon, la 
Chine, la Perse et autres États asiatiques, consacrent ou établissent 
des servitudes négatives, lorsqu’ils disposent que les nationaux 
européens y seront soumis, non pas à la justice locale, mais à leurs 
propres consuls qui leur font l’application des lois de leur patrie.”39 
In the Ottoman Empire, like in other non-Christian states, the 
principle of extraterritoriality was known and could work, granting 
to foreigner ministers and consuls a more or less extended civil and 
criminal jurisdiction. This grant did not undermine Ottoman 
foreign independence, but, as William Beach Lawrence stressed, 
“déroge à la règle universellement établie parmi les nations 
civilisées que ‘les lois de police et de sûreté obligent tous ceux qui 
                                                                                                             
 37.  About the relations between consular and local tribunals in the Ottoman 
Empire cf. FRANCESCO PAOLO CONTUZZI, 2 TRATTATO TEORICO-PRATICO DI 
DIRITTO CONSOLARE E DIPLOMATICO NEI RAFFRONTI COI CODICI (CIVILE, 
COMMERCIALE, PENALE E GIUDIZIARIO) E CON LE CONVENZIONI INTERNAZIONALI 
IN VIGORE 701 (Utet, Torino, 1911).  
 38.  FERRARA, supra note 19, at 232. 
 39.  PRADIER-FODÉRÉ, supra note 21, at 682.  
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habitant le territoire.’”40 It was confirmed as an international 
exception limited to the Oriental case.  
The phenomenon of foreigners’ privileges in the Levant 
could be justified by international law with a third argumentative 
solution, too. As noted earlier, foreigners (and consuls) were 
privileged people subject to the territorial power of the state where 
they resided, but released from its coercive force.41 This was 
possible because the Oriental state had waived its right of 
territorial sovereignty over them, allowing by capitulations or 
commercial treaties that personal sovereignty of foreigners’ 
national state went on. According to this conceptualization, there 
was no need to simulate that the foreigner was where he was not, 
but that there was a national state which “followed” its citizens 
wherever they went, wherever he was (we can hear the echo of 
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini and of the principle of nationality).42 
The logical preamble to strengthen the suspension of Ottoman 
juridical order towards European citizens, the filter to move from 
the territoriality to nationality criteria was, once again, 
“civilization.” 
 
IV. FROM CAPITULATIONS TO UNEQUAL TREATIES:  
THE LITERARY PLACES OF THE EXCEPTION 
 
The basic principles of new international relations 
concerned the right of nations to independence, self-determination 
and equality. The latter, especially, was of particular importance to 
modern International Law: all states had “the same right to 
participate in the process of formulation of international law.”43 
The states had to be entitled to take part in the drafting and 
conclusion of agreements that were of interest to them. This 
concept of equality was, of course, inferred from the idea of 
                                                                                                             
 40.  LAWRENCE, ÉTUDES SUR LA JURIDICTION CONSULAIRE EN PAYS 
CHRÉTIENS ET EN PAYS NON CHRÉTIENS ET SUR L’EXTRADITION 105 (F.A. 
Brockhaus, Leipzig,  1880).  
 41.  FERRARA, supra note 19, at 231-232. 
 42.  Nuzzo, Da Mazzini a Mancini: il principio di nazionalità tra politica e 
diritto, 14 GIORNALE DI STORIA COSTITUZIONALE 174-180 (2007). 
 43.  Ingrid Detter, The problem of Unequal Treaties, 15 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 1069 (1966). 
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sovereignty. For sovereignty implied, inter alia, not equality of 
power, but legal equality, such as–as Ingrid Detter pointed out in 
1966–that “states shall have had the same capacity to exercise their 
rights and to assume obligations.”44 In this respect, one did not 
always individuate the equality of states. There might a time that a 
state might find itself compelled into treaties with more 
dominating states, treaties which only favor the stronger of the 
parties, treaties which even sometimes are in conflict with the 
long-term national interest of the weaker state. Such treaties were 
often referred to as being “unequal.”45 This qualification of 
inequality was not accepted with favor by International Law, and 
this, as Matthew Craven has underlined, is for two reasons: the 
first was that the question of inequality in the context of treaty-
making appeared incoherent. If on the one hand, in fact, every 
treaty could be a manifestation of inequality (in terms of a 
substantive lack of equilibrium in the respective burdens and 
benefits, and in terms of an unequal bargaining power of the 
contracting parties), on the other, a presumption of equality might 
exist, since equal “contractual” capacity of the parties was there.46 
The second reason was the passive and acquiescent assumption in 
the rhetorical construction of the International Law of the 
nineteenth century of the unequal relations between European 
Powers and non-European territories and peoples in the gradual 
process of empire building. Until that moment, the international 
relations among states were not equal, because of the effect of non-
renounceable “colonial power” suggestions.47 It was a society 
where many subjects were under the colonial protected nations 
systems, or they were formally independent, but substantially 
suffering the consequences of unequal treaties with the imperial 
                                                                                                             
 44.  Id. At 1070. 
 45. Id. According to Richard Horowitz, “Unequal treaties formed the 
international legal mechanism for defining semi-colonial relationships.” They 
were unequal in several senses: “they were forced at gunpoint; they expressed 
the economic and political interests of [European Powers]; the key provisions, 
including extraterritoriality and restrictions on tariffs on foreign trade” and, they 
“were not reciprocal.” Richard S. Horowitz, International Law and State. 
Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth 
Century, 15 J. WORLD HIST. 455 (2004). 
 46.  Craven, supra note 8, at 337-338.  
 47.  In this way also GUSTAVO GOZZI, DIRITTI E CIVILTÀ. STORIA E 
FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 139 (Il Mulino, Bologna (2010). 
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powers. It was an “unequal” society.48 Therefore, with the logical 
preamble that those treaties might be the best juridical literary 
place to regulate and safeguard the lives of nationals in countries 
lacking common standards of civilization, the more civilized states, 
as Pillet said, transferred the old capitulations’ text into these 
special agreements on jurisdiction in countries where institutions 
were “inferior” or “different” from the civilization of most 
European and American States.49 These ideas were reflected, in 
particular, in a series of agreements of an overtly non-reciprocal 
nature between the Great Powers and the “less civilized” Ottoman 
Empire. Confirmed as a state in an “Oriental sense,”50 it was not 
allowed to participate in the European Concert and to share a 
common juridical conscience, but thanks to private treaties it could 
dialogue with Western Powers.51 Where there was no common 
language, there was still the language of the strongest state, i.e., the 
language of its policy, economy and moral obligations.52 
Transferring the capitulations’ text into these treaties, status quo 
did not change and all the old conceded immunities, now 
guaranteed by enforceability of bilateralism, ended in the 
exception. Although capitulations were, as concession acts of the 
sultan’s liberality, always potentially revocable and, for this 
reason, uncovered,53 the system of agreement by unequal treaties 
                                                                                                             
 48. Onuma Yasuaki, When was the Law of International Society Born?–An 
Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational 
Perspective, 2 J. HIST. INT’L L. 64 (2000).  
 49.  Detter, supra note 43, at 1075-1076. 
 50.  AUGUST WILHELM HEFFTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE L’EUROPE, 
(fr. trans., Cotillon et fils, Paris, 1873), distinguished between Oriental and 
European State: “l’état oriental est celui de la résignation et du servage, dans le 
quel le despotisme ou l’oligocratie s’est alliée à la hiérarchie.” Id. at 38.  
 51.  This in accordance with the doctrinal shared principle by which: 
Le droit des gens . . . il ne s’applique dans toute sa plénitude et 
avec l’entière réciprocité qui est de sa nature qu’entre ces 
mêmes peuples [chrétiens]. Il est du reste aisé de comprendre 
qu’entre nations reconnaissant des dogmes religieux 
identiques ou sensiblement analogues, il se forme des idées 
communes de justice qui rendent possible la reconnaissance 
d’un ensemble de droits et de devoirs mutuels.  
Antoine Pillet, Le droit international public, ses éléments constitutifs, son 
domaine, son objet, 1 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INT’L PUB. 24 (1894).  
 52.  Nuzzo, supra note 28, at 1335. 
 53.  Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, Le droit international et la phase actuelle 
de la Question d’Orient, 7 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LÉGISLATION 
COMPARÉE 304 (1875). 
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would have guaranteed the contracting parties the enforceability of 
its terms and, in default of their execution, the application of a 
penalty to the transgressor. They were treaties of commerce and 
establishment, the treaties by which European Powers completed 
their good opportunity to improve the mechanism. 
Related to the Ottoman Empire, the different way of 
Westerners to stuff the category of “sovereignty” with fluid 
contents clearly supplied a concrete need: their consciousness to 
work with something different persisted and legitimated the choice 
of suspension of a legal international order, to guarantee the best 
condition for foreigners residing or traveling in a territory which 
was outside the borders of the European juridical space.  
 
V. OTTOMAN EMPIRE:  
THE ELUSIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE GREAT EXPECTATIONS 
 
Turan Kayaoğlu, in a provocative way, recently wrote of 
the “Ottoman Empire’s elusive dream of sovereignty.”54 The 
perpetrated abjuration to recognize a real sovereign role of the 
Porte within the family of nations and an autonomous and 
sovereign Ottoman administration of justice in civil or criminal 
cases in which foreigners were involved, justified this “elusive” 
dimension of the dream. This was particularly difficult to support 
in consideration of the excellent examples of intersection and 
reception of foreign law with the construction of new legal systems 
and transformations of society that the Ottoman Empire realized in 
the nineteenth century.55 I allude to the period of reforms, 
“modernization,” and “westernization” of the Ottoman legal order 
(Tanzîmât period), conventionally started in 1839 by the Hatt 
Hümayün of Gülkhâne, the year after the signing of the unequal 
French and English treaties of commerce of 1838 (which 
confirmed foreigners’ privileges and consular jurisdiction).  
Some signs of Western distrust towards Ottoman justice 
were already present in 1820. Before the establishment of the 
consular tribunals, in fact, under a “convention verbale” among the 
                                                                                                             
 54.  TURAN KAYAOĞLU, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, AND CHINA 104 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).  
 55.  Hill, supra note 24, at 288.  
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powers, a Mixed Judicial Committee (Commission Judiciaire 
Mixte) was instituted to try the civil disputes between foreigners of 
different nationalities. This was not a permanent committee, but it 
met every time a dispute arose. It was organized and convened by 
the Mission of the defendant which designated two judges. The 
third was appointed by the claimant. The decisions of the 
committee were not immediately enforceable, but needed the 
homologation of the consular tribunal of the defendant. This mixed 
system worked until 1864, when the Court of Appeal of Aix, in 
Provence, undermined its authority. The pronunciation, using the 
article 52 of the 1740’s Capitulation and the reason of the absence 
of a written text to prove the real existence of the convention of 
1820, declared that there was no obligation for the French to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the Mixed Committee. Then, there had 
been a misinterpretation of article 52 and its juridical value: it did 
not officially organize any ambassadors’ jurisdiction to try the 
disputes between foreigners of different nationalities. Therefore, 
the Court pronunciation of 1864 gave a death blow to the Mixed 
Committees in favour of the consular tribunals.56 
On the other hand, the reform period of the Empire could 
not be so seriously considered if in 1840 the commercial board of 
mixed traders councils was established in Turkey, and in 1848 
European Powers holding capitulary privileges negotiated the 
formal recognition of them, composed of foreign, Muslim 
Ottoman, and non-Muslim Ottoman citizens.57 After the 
introduction of the French Commercial Code as Ottoman Code of 
Commerce (1850), in 1873, at the Conference of Constantinople, 
the Règlement d’Organisation Judiciaire was adopted and mixed 
tribunals found their own Charter of regulation within the 
Empire:58 they would be formally inaugurated in 1875, on June 28. 
                                                                                                             
 56.  MANDELSTAM, supra note 35, at 230-231. 
 57.  About the institution of the tribunals cf. the references in Roma, 
10.07.1890, Letter of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador 
in Constantinople, n. 24390: Nel 1848 la Porta istituì i Tribunali, Archivo 
Storico Diplomatico del Ministero delgi Affari Esteri (ASDMAE), 63, b. 15 
(1886-1894), f. 1, Questioni relative all’Amministrazione della giustizia in 
Turchia (abolizione dei tribunal commerciali provinciali)). According to Hill, 
the establishment of the tribunals was in 1847. Hill, supra note 24, at 299. 
 58.  Renton, supra note 17, at 215. 
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According to Esin Örücü, “sometimes ‘mixedness’ can be 
the manifestation of a transition, sometimes it can be the final 
outcome of the process. ‘Mixedness’ is usually a result of 
historical accident and accidents can lead to unexpected outcomes 
along unexpected paths.”59 In the Ottoman case, this vocation to a 
mixed solution seemed to be more the final outcome than the 
transition moment of the process, especially if one considers the 
compromise dimension of mixed tribunals’ establishment, and the 
transitional value of the umpteenth occurrence of the disturbed 
relations among European Powers and the Porte in the nineteenth 
century. I allude to the Congress of Paris of 1856: at the end of the 
Crimean War, in order to establish new conditions of peace in the 
Balkan area, the homonymous Treaty admitted the Ottoman 
Empire to participate in the advantages of European Public Law 
(art. 7).60 Even if functional to European aims, the situation 
became embarrassing, as well as unusual and humiliating, for the 
Porte.61 Thanks to that stipulation, the logical preamble of the 
unequal treaties and the theoretical framework to justify the 
maintenance of capitulary privileges and consular jurisdictions 
formally seemed to fail: it was inconceivable to preserve such a  
                                                                                                             
 59.  Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?, 
ELECTRONIC J. OF COMP. L. 12 (2008) available at http://www.ejcl.org  (Last 
visited December 11, 2011).    
 60.  TRAITÉ DE PAIX SIGNÉ À PARIS LE 30 MARS 1856 ENTRE LA SARDAIGNE, 
L’AUTRICHE, LA FRANCE, LE ROYAUME UNI DE LA GRANDE BRETAGNE ET 
D’IRLANDE, LA PRUSSE, LA RUSSIE ET LA TURQUIE AVEC LES CONVENTIONS QUI 
EN FONT PARTIE, LES PROTOCOLES DE LA CONFÉRENCE ET LA DÉCLARATION SUR 
LES DROITS MARITIMES EN TEMPS DE GUERRE 10 (Imprimerie Royale, Turin 
1856). 
Art. 7. Sa Majesté le roi de Sardaigne, Sa Majesté l’Empereur 
d’Autriche, Sa Majesté l’Empereur des Français, Sa Majesté la 
Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande Bretagne et l’Irlande, Sa 
Majesté le Roi de Prusse et Sa Majesté l’Empereur de toutes 
les Russies déclarent la Sublime Porte admise à participer aux 
avantages du droit public et du concert européens. Leurs 
Majestés s’engagent, chacune de son côté, à respecter 
l’indépendance et l’intégrité territoriale de l’Empire Ottoman, 
garantissent, en commun, la stricte observation de cet 
engagement, et considéreront, en conséquence, tout acte de 
nature à y porter atteinte, comme une question d’intérêt 
général. 
Id. 
 61.  Engelhardt, supra note 31, at 535.  
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strong discriminating marker among proclaimed allies.62 During 
the Congress session of March 25, 1856, Alî Paşa, the 
plenipotentiary of the sultan, expressly denounced this discrepancy 
and asked for the abolition of capitulations and its corollaries 
which stood, he said, in the way of the renewal of the Ottoman 
state. For the first time, all the various forms of Western juridical 
(and judicial) immunities started to appear as an unjust ostracism 
by, and an unjust interference of, Western Powers.63 The 
negotiating parties showed their solidarity, but the question stayed 
unanswered and they did not mention the subject in the Treaty. The 
natural incoherence of the formally declared admission of the 
Ottoman Empire to the International Society started revealing 
itself. It was clear that article 7 could not work–as some scholar 
noticed–as a turning point for international relations between 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, if we consider 
                                                                                                             
 62.  “Even though a significant portion of the Empire was based in Europe, 
it cannot be said to have been of Europe.” Thomas Naff, The Ottoman Empire 
and the European States System, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY 143 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1984). 
 63.  According to this perspective, the Ottoman power itself, at the end of 
the nineteenth century, started to promote the abolition of capitulations. 
Engelhardt, supra note 31, at 75-76. In Paris Alî Paşa said: 
 Les privilèges acquis, par les capitulations, aux Européens, 
nuisent à leur propre sécurité et au développement de leurs 
transactions, en limitant l’intervention de l’administration 
locale ; que la juridiction, dont les agents étrangers couvrent 
leurs nationaux, constitue une multiplicité de gouvernements 
dans le gouvernement et, par conséquent, un obstacle 
infranchissable à toutes les améliorations. 
France: 
Reconnais que les capitulations répondent à une situation à 
laquelle le traité de paix tendra nécessairement à mettre fin, et 
que les privilèges, qu’elles stipulent pour les personnes, 
circonscrivent l’autorité de la Porte dans des limites 
regrettables ; qu’il y a lieu d’aviser à des tempéraments 
propres à tout concilier ; mais qu’il n’est pas moins important 
de les proportionner aux réformes que la Turquie introduit 
dans son administration de manière à combiner les garanties 
nécessaires aux étrangers avec celles qui naîtront des mesures 
dont la Porte poursuis l’application. 
That contest was not suitable to discuss and resolve the matter of capitulations. 
The contribution at the congress was considered as a “voeu” to deliberate in 
another place, very probable in Constantinople, about capitulations. In the 
meantime, they remained in effect. Protocole n. XIV, Séance du 25 mars 1856, 
in TRAITÉ DE PAIX SIGNÉ À PARIS LE 30 MARS 1856, at 102-104. 
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literally the passage of the “admission” in the text of the Treaty, 
the reference was only to an “admission to the advantages,” not 
also to a mutual recognition and a concrete participation of the 
Porte to the European System.64  
After Paris, the discussion on capitulations was postponed 
until a future date, when a multilateral conference on 
extraterritoriality would be held in Constantinople. The conference 
never took place.  
The indifference of the European Powers to capitulations 
points to both their imperialistic aims, and their persistence in the 
consideration of residing Western co-nationals and non-Muslim 
protégés as a kind of fifth column within the Levant. All the forms 
of European interference with the domestic policy of the sultan 
appeared, instead, as a kind of “peaceful penetration” and 
contradictions remained.65 That admission of the Ottoman Empire 
into European international society appeared to be necessary but 
“premature,” because “it had not yet attained the standard of 
‘civilization’ that would allow Europeans to accept Ottoman 
jurisdiction over Western foreigners.”66 For this reason 
capitulations might remain. So, article 7 of the Treaty of Paris 
could be read as a “precautionary rule” to an ambitious but young 
international law. Therefore, the misunderstandings remained 
strong due to the risk of interpretations that could read too much 
into the text. An example in this sense was the declaration of 
Keçecizade Mehmet Fuat Paşa (Grand Vizier and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs during the Tanzîmât period) who, in 1858, noted:  
La Porte élève la juste prétention de voir cesser de 
fait un ostracisme qui a cessé de droit depuis le 
congrès de Paris, et elle se croit pleinement 
                                                                                                             
 64.  Cf. Augusti, The Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Paris, between 
new Declensions and old Prejudices, in CROSSING LEGAL CULTURES 503-517 
(Laura Beck Varela et al. eds., 3 Jahrbuch Junge Rechtsgeschichte, M. 
Meidenbauer, München, 2009). 
 65.  Renton, supra note 17, at 219. According to Samim Akgönül, “le 
système des ‘protégés’ deviant sourtout au 19e siècle un moyen pour les 
puissances occidentales d’avoir un œil sur la politique de la Sublime Porte.” 
SAMIM AKGÖNÜL, MINORITÉS EN TURQUIE. TURCS EN MINORITÉ. REGARDS 
CROISÉS SUR L’ALTÉRITÉ COLLECTIVE DANS LE CONTEXTE TURC 68 (Isis, 
Istanbul,  2010). 
 66.  KAYAOĞLU, supra note 54, at 111-112. 
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autorisée à protester contre le maintien de privilèges 
qui la privent des avantages essentiels du droit 
public moderne auxquelles elle a été appelée à 
participer en vertu du traité du 30 mars 1856.67 
 Scholarly scrutiny was obviously needed. At that time, the 
most important academic organ of international law was the 
Institut de droit international. On September 10, 1887, during the 
plenary session, the objective was communicated : the composition 
of a new commission with the task of “Rechercher les réformes 
désirables dans les institutions judiciaires actuellement en vigueur 
dans le pays d’Orient.”68 It took office in the Lausanne session of 
1889. De Blumerincq, Carathéodory Efendi, Engelhardt, Féraud-
Giraud, Ferguson, De Labra, De Martens, Perels, Renault, Rolin-
Jaequemyns, Torres-Campos, Traver Twiss were the jurists 
responsible to investigate about the matter.69  
 As long as the jurists tried to organize international law in 
this manner, capitulations, unequal treaties, consuls and mixed 
courts were confirmed and appeared the irremissible instruments in 
the hands of Europe to force the Ottoman Empire to its decline, 
depriving from the inside the last shape of its sovereignty. This 
happened in 1878, when all the exceptional system of immunities 
by capitulations and unequal treaties was once and for all expressly 
confirmed by another Treaty.70 Minds would not change for 
                                                                                                             
 67.  ANONYMOUS, LA TURQUIE DEVANT L’EUROPE 23 (E. Dentu, Paris, 
1858). 
 68.  Alphonse Rivier, Notice historique sur l’Institut de droit international, 
sa fondation et sa première session, Gand 1873, Genève 1874, in INSTITUT DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL. ANNUAIRE (1877); Bureau de la Revue de Droit 
International, Gand 1877 [repr. Schmidt Periodicals Gmbh, Bad Feilnbach 
1994], at 11-16. About the Institute cf. Luigi Nuzzo, Disordine politico e ordine 
giuridico. Iniziative e utopie nel diritto internazionale di fine Ottocento, in 2, 
MATERIALI PER UNA STORIA DELLA CULTURA GIURIDICA, 319-338 (2011); 
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 39-41 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2002); ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 
NEUVIÈME ANNÉE 1887-1888 14 (1888).  
 69.  ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, DIXIÈME ANNÉE 
1888-1889 15 (1889). 
 70.  Art. 8, Traité signé à Berlin, le 13 juillet 1878, entre la France, 
l’Allemagne, l’Autriche-Hongrie, la Grande-Bretagne, l’Italie, la Russie et la 
Turquie, in A. DE CLERCQ, XII RECUEIL DES TRAITÉS DE LA FRANCE 321 (A. 
Durand & Pedone-Lauriel, Paris 1880). The article was proposed at the 
preliminary session of June 24, 1878, by the Italian minister Luigi Corti, on 
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seventy years. After the memorandum of September 9, 1914, by 
which the Ottomans stressed to European Powers the 
incompatibility of extraterritoriality with territorial jurisdiction and 
national sovereignty (with a further enumeration of injustices and 
humiliations suffered), and the rejection of Austria and Germany 
of an Ottoman unilateral abolition of extraterritoriality, the Treaty 
of general relations concluded at Lausanne (August 6, 1923) 
designed to re-establish the consular and commercial relations of 
the Contracting Parties, and to regulate the conditions of the 
intercourse and residence of the nationals of each of them on the 
territory of the other “in accordance with principles of international 
law, and on the basis of reciprocity.” In conformity with the 
avowed object of the Treaty, the Contracting Parties, in art. 2, 
declared the capitulations concerning the régime of foreigners in 
Turkey, together with the economic and financial system resulting 
from the capitulations, “to be completely abrogated;” and in art. 30 
they agreed that “from the coming into force of the new treaty the 
treaties formerly concluded between [Contracting Parties] and the 
Ottoman Empire shall absolutely and finally cease to be 
effective.”71 At Lausanne, as Kayaoğlu has underlined, “Turkish 
dreams of putting Western citizens and commercial interest under 
its jurisdiction materialized.”72 In reality, this was only the start of 
another phase of declensions and perturbations of the Ottoman 
“hanging” sovereignty. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
behalf of the French, Italian and Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiaries. The first 
draft provided: “Les immunités et privilèges des sujets étrangers ainsi que la 
juridiction et le droit de protection consulaires, tels qu’ils ont été établis par le 
Capitulations et usages, resteront en pleine vigueur,” Protocole n. 5 (Séance du 
24 juin 1878), in id. at 202. In the same session, Benjamin Disraeli, Lord of 
Beaconsfield, the British Prime Minister, stressed how inappropriate it was to 
spend that time in the capitulations’ discourse, still under review: “il ne faudra 
pas les sauvegarder si elles sont inutiles; il y aurait lieu, sans doute, de leur 
donner une force additionnelle dans le cas contraire; mais l’impression de S. 
Exc. est qu’elles sont destinées a disparaître.” In reality, capitulations were 
preserved, and not only as a reference in the treaty, but in the law-relations with 
the countries of Christendom until 1923. Protocole n. 5 (Séance du 24 juin 
1878), in id. at 214. 
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